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Abstract - As the web has become a place for sharing of information and resources across 
varied domains, there is a need for providing authorization services in addition to authentication 
services provided by public key infrastructure (PKI). In distributed systems the use of attribute 
certificates (AC) has been explored as a solution for implementation of authorization services and 
their use is gaining popularity. AC issued by attribute authority (AA) facilitates identification of a 
service requester and can be used to enforce access control for resources. AC of a service 
requester is used as part of credentials supplied during the service request for accessing any 
resource. As there exist potentially multiple issuing domains which issue credentials, therefore 
the target domain must allow access to resources by considering different credentials and must 
be able to decide about which set of attributes can be considered as valid attributes for making 
access control decisions. In this paper, we present an authorization based access control model 
that allows a fine grained access control to resources in an open domain by utilizing attributes 
issued by diverse attribute authorities.  
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A Fine Grained Access Control Model Based on 
Diverse Attributes 
Rajender Nath  , Gulshan Ahuja 
Abstract - As the web has become a place for sharing of 
information and resources across varied domains, there is a 
need for providing authorization services in addition to 
authentication services provided by public key infrastructure 
(PKI). In distributed systems the use of attribute certificates 
(AC) has been explored as a solution for implementation of 
authorization services and their use is gaining popularity.   AC 
issued by attribute authority (AA) facilitates identification of a 
service requester and can be used to enforce access control 
for resources. AC of a service requester is used as part of 
credentials supplied during the service request for accessing 
any resource. As there exist potentially multiple issuing 
domains which issue credentials, therefore the target domain 
must allow access to resources by considering different 
credentials and must be able to decide about which set of 
attributes can be considered as   valid attributes for making 
access control decisions. In this paper, we present an 
authorization based access control model that allows a fine 
grained access control to resources in an open domain by 
utilizing attributes issued by diverse attribute authorities. 
Keywords : attribute certificates, attribute authority, 
authorization, access control. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ith continually changing business environment 
privacy and protection of resources is 
becoming more and more important. The 
access control to resources is bound up with the 
authentication and the authorization. There is a strong 
need felt for receptive authorization infrastructure that 
can cater for rapidly changing dynamic environments 
and should be able to validate the identity of service 
requesters.  
The commonly used credentials for access are 
identity credentials, attribute credentials and 
authorization credentials. Identity based access control 
systems require identity certificates which are issued 
and certified by certification authorities (CA). When a CA 
issues an identity certificate, it binds a particular public 
key to the name of the service requester (SR) identified 
by the certificate. In addition to a public key, a certificate 
always includes information such as the validity period, 
the name of the CA, the digital signature of the issuing 
CA  etc. Identity  based  credentials  are  more  suitable  
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where service requesters are already known to the 
service provider (SP) through the process of registration. 
This approach works well in a tightly coupled 
environment. Identity based access control puts a 
constraint of prior registration of every service requester 
which limits the scalability of overall system. Another 
access control approach is based on the authorization 
certificates which are based on the principle of 
delegation of rights and responsibilities. The 
authorization certificates are issued by the authorization 
authorities who have rights to access the specific 
resource and thus can delegate full or subset of rights to 
other users. The authorization certificates usually contain 
the identity of the resource, identity of the service 
requester, access rights to access the resource, etc. 
The advantage of authorization certificates are that 
service requesters are authenticated in their own 
domain and another service requester to whom the 
rights have been delegated can realize the access 
control based on delegated rights. A different area of 
research developments is access control based on 
attributes. In attributes based access control systems 
the access policy is based on the various attributes 
which are assigned to the service requesters. The 
attribute certificates are issued by Attribute Authority 
(AA) and these contain the name value pairs of the 
various attributes. Attributes based authorization offers 
more flexibility and scalability for an open and 
distributed environment. The use of AC based on 
privilege management infrastructure (PMI), allows 
including and revoking attributes and can contain 
information about the privileges or roles of a user. AC 
conveys a short-lived attribute about a given subject and 
can be used to authenticate the identity of the attribute 
certificate holder. A real time problem arises when the 
request made by a service requester requires attributes 
which have been issued by diverse attribute authorities 
and are located at different locations. The authorization 
efforts become more difficult when two or more AAs 
save attributes for a service requester with different 
identities. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. 
Section II highlights the related work. Section III 
highlights the requirements to develop a new model 
based on diverse attributes. Section IV describes the 
implementation architecture and explains the working of 
proposed model. Finally Section V concludes and briefly 
describes scope for the future work. 
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II. RELATED WORK 
Traditional access control approaches base 
their authorization decisions on subject’s identity. A 
number of research papers based on attributes based 
authorization have been proposed by researchers. 
Ioannis Mavridis et al. [1] proposed a mechanism for 
access control based on attribute certificates for 
medical Internet applications. David Chadwick [2] 
proposed X.509 privilege management infrastructure. 
Later David Chadwick et al. [3] proposed Role-Based 
Access Control with X.509 Attribute Certificates. The 
proposed approach in paper adopted the standard 
X.509 PMI to build an efficient role-based trust 
management system in which role assignments can be 
widely distributed among organizations, and an XML-
based local policy determines which roles to trust and 
which privileges to grant. Jordi Forne et al. [4] presented 
an implementation of an authorization system for web 
based applications based on the ITU-T X509 
recommendations which specifies use of privilege 
management infrastructure for realizing access control. 
Access control mechanism based on authorization, 
using attributes issued by a remote attribute authority, 
has been proposed by S. Cantor. [5]. Wei Zhou et al. [6] 
proposed a role based access control with attribute 
certificates. Alfieri R. et al. presents a VOMS model [7] 
for managing authorization in a Grid Environment and 
allows coalition of multiple attributes. Eric Yuan [8] 
proposed an attribute based access control (ABAC) 
model as a new approach, which is based on subject, 
object, and environment attributes and supports both 
mandatory and discretionary access control needs. M 
Liu et al. [9] proposed an attribute and role based 
access control model ARBAC for web services. 
However, the role remains static and when assigned it 
becomes out of date. Alan H. Karp [10] proposed an 
implementation based on authorization based access 
control (ABAC) for services oriented architecture. David 
W Chadwick [11] presented a model and protocol 
elements for linking AAs, service providers and user 
attributes together, under the sole control of the user 
and allowed merging the attributes from multiple AAs in 
order to grant the user access to its resources. Frikken 
K et al. [12] proposed an approach for attribute based 
access control with hidden policies and hidden 
credentials. Shen Hai Bo et al. [13] proposed an 
attribute based access control model for web services. 
Nirmal Dagdee et al. [14] proposed an access control 
methodology for sharing of open and Domain confined 
data using Standard Credentials. The methodology 
requires that various types of standard credentials and 
related attributes are identified and published by some 
apex authority so that the resource providers can define 
their access policies in terms of these standard 
credentials. In real terms, identification of standard 
credentials is a very difficult task and is not suitable for 
largely distributed systems having millions of service 
requesters. Regina N. Hebig et al. [15] describe a 
prototype implementation with an architecture based on 
the standards XACML, SAML, WSPolicy, WS-
SecurityPolicy and WS-Trust which puts the focus on 
sharing identity and attribute information across 
independent domains for the purpose of access control.  
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
The service requester’s credentials may be 
stored or issued in a variety of places, for example, each 
AA may store the attributes or the credentials it issues in 
its own repository. When a service requester makes a 
request to service provider for accessing a resource and 
presents its credentials. At service provider’s end, the 
presented set of attributes may not be sufficient enough 
to grant access to a resource. This necessitates that 
service requester must collect together the credentials 
required for making access to a resource. David W 
Chadwick [11] presented a model and protocol 
elements for linking attributes from multiple AAs. His 
approach requires input from the user who wish to link 
attributes from multiple AAs. However, the main issue 
with his approach is that user has to initiate multiple 
browser instances and execute steps for cross linkages 
between multiple attribute authorities. If the number of 
attributes required for grant of access belongs to 
multiple attribute authorities, the same process is to be 
carried multiple times for providing linkages between 
multiple attribute authorities. This makes the task of 
service requester more complex and time consuming. 
We propose a new model where the service requester’s 
task of creating linkages is eliminated and the process 
of linkage is initiated by service provider only. The 
proposed work also takes care of the privacy concern of 
the service requester to ensure that service provider will 
be able to link attributes from multiple attribute 
authorities only when service requester desires to create 
linkages with multiple attribute authorities. 
IV. PROPOSED MODEL 
This section describes the details of proposed 
model. The approach requires that all organizations who 
are willing to exchange and share information among 
them must form agreements for a number of conditions 
i.e. security mechanisms to be used, attribute definitions 
etc. and must pre establish a certain level of trust. Such 
sort of arrangement is termed as federation and is same 
as Shibboleth federations [16]. The mechanism 
assumes that linking between AAs is based on secured 
shared information and there also has to be secured 
shared information between a service requester and all 
attribute authorities where service requester is registered 
for attribute sharing. 
An authorization model based on diverse 
attributes from different attribute authorities is shown in 
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A Fine Grained Access Control Model Based on Diverse Attributes
Figure 1. The diagram reflects following components 
involved in the access mechanism.  
•
 
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) intercepts all 
incoming requests from service requesters. Every 
received request is sent to the PDP. PEP allows or 
denies access to the service requester for access of 
requested resource.
 
•
 
Policy Decision Point (PDP) evaluates the applicable 
policies against service requests. PDP checks for 
the available attributes in the service request to 
check whether access request can be granted or 
not. In case the attributes contained in service 
request are not sufficient enough for grant of access 
to resource, it hands over the request parameters 
along with information about additional attributes 
required for grant of access request.
 
•
 
Attributes authorization and linker module (AALM) is 
responsible for contacting concerned attribute 
authorities for making request of additional 
attributes and sends back the attributes received 
from multiple attribute authorities to PDP.
 
•
 
Policy store contains policies for making access 
control decisions. The policies can be stored in XML 
format as it allows standard representation of 
access control rules.
 
Extensible access
 
control
 
markup language (XACML) [17] [17] can be used to 
allow implementation of access control policies.
 
•
 
Policy management interface allows handling of 
policies in the policy store.
 
a)
 
Overview
 
A service requester can acquire multiple 
identities by registering with a number of attribute 
authorities. The decision to register with the attribute 
authority can be based on its reputation, quality of 
service etc. The mechanism requires that every
 
service 
requester and all AAs to whom requester wishes to link 
must exchange and agree upon conversation framework 
for transfer of information between them.
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Figure 1 : Diverse attributes based authorization model
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The service provider should not be able to 
obtain attributes from any AA without knowledge and 
permission from the service requester. The AAs who are 
willing to exchange information must make groups with 
predefined policies and rules. There has to be one or 
more than one primary attribute authority. The primary 
attribute authorities act as the root for all other AAs 
which are members of the group. Before making a 
request for accessing any resource, the service 
requester must acquire credentials from one of the 
primary certified authority. The attributes returned by the 
primary AA contain a basic set of the attributes along 
with information about all AAs for which service 
requester has already registered and has agreed to use 
additional attributes.  Each service provider in the 
federation is free to decide about the number and types 
of attributes for granting access requests. The service 
providers may grant access on basic set of attributes or 
may decide to impose more security check by imposing 
requirement for additional attributes from one or more 
AAs.  
b) SAML based conversation framework 
We use SAML assertions for describing 
conversation tokens. Figure 2 depicts conversation 
framework between service requester and provider. 
Figure 3 describes the format of SAML based 
conversation tokens.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let ATSb
 
be the basic set of attributes and Σ
 
is 
an alphabet, a non-empty
 
finite
 
set. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3
 
:
 
Conversation Token Format
 
 
 
The set of all attributes over Σ
 
of any length can 
be denoted in terms of Σn
 
as
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= ∪
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Figure 3.
 
Conversation Token Format
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 SOAP Body
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Data
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(Service Requester) 
 
Encryption Key (PBKSR)
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Subject Confirmation 
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ECT
 
Encrypted Conversation Token
 
(ECT)
 
Primary AA
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Request 
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Service 
Provider (SP)
 
Figure 2
 
:
 
Conversation  Framework
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  10
20
11
Se
pt
em
be
r 
©  2011 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
 V
ol
um
e 
X
I 
Is
su
e 
X
V
 V
er
si
on
 I
 
A Fine Grained Access Control Model Based on Diverse Attributes
Let service requester SR is registered with three 
attribute authorities. As identity SR1 with attribute 
authority AA1, as identity SR2 with AA2, as identity SR3
with AA3.  The conversation token from the primary 
attribute authority to service requester will be of the form 
as defined below.
   
 
ATS
 
{SR, Time_Stamp}PBK SR
 
AA1{ SR1, Time_Stamp}PBKAA1
 
AA2{ SR2, Time_Stamp}PBKAA2
 
AA3{ SR3, Time_Stamp}PBKAA3
 
c)
 
Authentication of conversation tokens
 
As per figure 1 and figure 2, the authorization 
process is divided in to 2 parts: obtaining of basic set of 
attributes from the primary attribute authority and
 
use of 
attributes for making authorization decisions. For the 
first part, since it is assumed that service requester 
trusts the primary attribute authority and can decrypt 
and obtain the basic set of attributes using its private 
key PVKSR. 
 
The primary attribute authority also passes on 
the encrypted info for every other AA where service 
requester’s attributes are already located. This 
encryption is carried using public key of the 
corresponding attribute authority. The second part is an 
establishment stage
 
where ECT is used by service 
provider to make access decision. When a service 
requester makes a request for accessing a resource, the 
service provider executes following tasks:
 
 
Task 1:Service requester obtains credentials 
from primary attribute authority. The credentials issued 
by primary attribute authority to the service requester are 
encrypted using public key of respective authority and 
are sent in format as in figure 3.
 
Task 2 :The service requester decrypts the 
basic attributes, using its private key PVKSR and presents 
the basic set of attributes along with encrypted info 
about AAs, acquired from primary AA, to service 
provider. 
 
Task 3
 
:
 
On receiving the request, the service 
provider checks for the basic set of attributes against 
already specified policies in the policy store to decide 
whether access can be granted or not.
 
Task 4
 
:
 
In case the existing policies do not 
allow access based on basic set of attributes contained 
in the service request, the PDP module passes the 
service request to the AALM module.
 
Task 5
 
:
 
AALM module extracts the information 
from the service request to find out for which all other 
AAs service requester has already registered. The 
request message along with the requester’s URL was 
encrypted using public key of concerned AA so it can be 
decrypted using private key by the concerned AA only. 
The service provider just knows that at which attribute 
authority the service requester is registered so this helps 
to maintain the privacy concern of the requester 
because service provider can not determine the identity 
and attributes of the requester located on a particular 
AA.
 
Task 6
 
: AALM sends a request message for the 
required attributes to the concerned AAs along with the 
encrypted info about requester’s identity and date time 
stamp.
 
  
Task 7
 
:
  
AA decrypts the information 
corresponding to its requested attribute set using its 
private key and extracts the identity of service requester 
and also verifies the date and time stamp for validity of 
message. For example SR had already registered with 
AA1 as SR1, therefore upon successful decryption of the 
message, AA1 can ascertain about SR1.
 
Task 8
 
: To make sure that SR is willing to allow 
attributes from AA, it redirects an authentication request 
to SR.
 
Task 9
 
: Once the service requester 
authenticates with AA, the information regarding 
attributes required by the service provider is shown and 
service requester is given a choice to allow passing 
back the set of attributes to the service provider.
 
 
Task 10
 
: Once the confirmation is made by the
 
service requester, the one or more required attributes 
are sent back to the service provider.
 
Tasks from 6 to 9 are repeated for every AA to 
whom AALM module sends a request for additional 
attributes. In the event of any AA failing to provide 
required attributes the request is terminated with an 
appropriate response to the service requester.
 
The access control decision based on diverse 
attributes can be realized in terms of a function
 
f   (ATSb)
 
or
 
f   (ATSb × ATSi
 
× ATSj  × ATSj )
 
 
Where ATSb is the basic set of attributes for SR, 
and ATSi,
 
ATSj , ATSj are the set of attributes for three 
different attribute authorities identified as AAi, AAj, AAk 
respectively. 
 
The above mentioned function is implemented 
and used by PEP component to decide whether the 
access to resource can be allowed based on basic set 
of attributes or attribute assignments from multiple AAs 
can be evaluated. The implementation of function solely 
depends upon the policies and requirements of the 
service provider. The evaluation outcome can be 
considered for granting access to the resource. The 
access control mechanism discussed in this paper 
allows in implementing fine grained access control 
based on multiple attributes. The proposed approach 
allows every service provider to decide the level
 
of 
security for granting access request. The service 
provider can choose to allow access request based on 
the basic set of attributes or may put more restrictions 
by imposing requirements for attributes from one or 
more AAs. The use of basic set of attributes works well 
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A Fine Grained Access Control Model Based on Diverse Attributes
for a large number of service requesters who most of 
the times need access to resource based on basic 
information. However, the ability for any service provider 
to impose requirement for additional attributes helps in 
achieving fine grained access control.
  
V.
 
CONCLUSION
 
In this paper, authors have proposed a 
mechanism for allowing access to a resource based on 
the multiple attributes from one or more AAs. The merit 
of the proposed approach is that service provider can 
link to the attribute authorities and obtain attributes for 
grant of access only when it is permitted by the service 
requester. Even if the service provider is able to 
determine that to which all AAs the service requester 
has already registered, it can not automatically obtain 
attributes without service requester’s permission. The 
proposed approach focuses only on authorization of 
requests based on attributes. The future work may 
consider other aspects related with attributes based 
access without involvement of centralized authority
 
and 
automated trust establishment.
 
REFERENCES
 
REFERENCES
 
REFERENCIAS
 
1.
 
Ioannis Mavridis, Christos Georgiadis, George 
Pangalos, marie Khair, “Access Control based on 
Attribute certificates for Medical Internet 
applications”, Journal of medical Internet Research, 
Vol 3, 2001.
 
2.
 
David Chadwick, “The X.509 Privilege Management 
Infrastructure”,http://sec.cs.kent.ac.uk/download/X5
09
 
pmiNATO.pdf, 2002 .
 
3.
 
David W. Chadwick, Alexander Otenko, and Edward 
Ball,” Role-Based Access Control with
 
X.509 
Attribute Certificates”,
 
IEEE internet computing, 
march-april 2003, pp. 62 –
 
69.
 
4.
 
J. F d an d M. F. Hanarejos , “Web-based 
Authorization based on X.509 Privilege Management 
Infrastructure “,IEEE Pacific Rim Conference on 
Communications, Computers and signal 
Processing, 2003.
 
5.
 
S. Cantor. “Shibboleth Architecture, Protocols and 
Profiles”, Working Draft 02. 22 September 2004, 
http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/
 
6.
 
Wei Zhou, Christoph Meinel, “Implement Role based 
access control with attribute certificates”, The 6th 
IEEE International Conference on Advanced 
Communication Technology, page(s): 536-
 
540, 
2004.
  
7.
 
Alfieri, R., Cecchini, R., Ciaschini, V., Dell'Agnello, L., 
Frohner, A., Lorentey, K., Spataro, F., “From 
gridmap-file to VOMS: managing authorization in a 
Grid environment”. Future Generation Computer 
Systems. Vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 549-558. Apr. 2005.
 
8.
 
Eric Yuan et al.,” Attributed Based Access Control 
(ABAC) for Web
 
Services”, IEEE International 
Conference on Web Services 2005.
 
9.
 
Liu M., GUO H Q., and SU J D., “An Attribute and 
Role-Based Access Control Model for Web 
Services”, In proceedings of The Fourth 
International Conference on Machine Learning and 
Cybernetics, Guangzhou, China, 18-21 August 
2005. 
 
10.
 
Alan H. Karp, “Authorization-Based Access Control 
for the Services Oriented Architecture, Proceedings 
of the Fourth International Conference on Creating, 
Connecting and Collaborating through Computing”, 
2006.
 
11.
 
David W Chadwick,” Authorisation using Attributes 
from Multiple Authorities”, Proceedings of the 15th 
IEEE International Workshops on Enabling 
Technologies Infrastructure for Collaborative 
Enterprises 2006.
 
12.
 
Frikken K, Atallah M, Jiangtao Li, “Attribute-Based 
Access Control with Hidden Policies and Hidden 
Credentials”, IEEE Transactions on Computers, 
Volume 55, Issue 10, Page(s): 1259 –
 
1270, Oct. 
2006.
 
13.
 
Shen Hai Bo, Hong Fan, “An attribute based access 
control model for web services”, Proceeding of the 
7th International Conference on Parallel and 
Distributed Computing, Applications and 
Technologies, IEEE 2006.
 
14.
 
Nirmal Dagdee, Ruchi Vijaywargiya,” Access control 
methodology for sharing of open and Domain 
confined data using Standard Credentials”, 
International Journal on
 
Computer Science and 
Engineering Vol.1(3), 2009, 148-155.
 
15.
 
Regina N. Hebig et al., “A Web Service Architecture 
for Decentralized Identity-
 
and Attribute-based 
Access Control”, IEEE International Conference on 
Web Services, 2009.
 
16.
 
http://www.educause.edu/EDUCAUSEQuarterly/ED
UCAUSEQuarterlyMagazineVolum/FederatedSecurit
yTheShibboleth/157315
 
17.
 
http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/xacml/
 
repository/
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  12
20
11
Se
pt
em
be
r 
©  2011 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
 V
ol
um
e 
X
I 
Is
su
e 
X
V
 V
er
si
on
 I
 
A Fine Grained Access Control Model Based on Diverse Attributes
